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DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF LIFTED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
IN CUBA AND BURMA 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced that the U.S. would 
restore full diplomatic relations with Cuba, opening up trade and 
commercial ties that had been cut off for nearly fifty-five years.1 
Normalizing relations after nearly six decades of hostility marks a stark 
transition in U.S. policy. The tumultuous U.S.-Cuba relationship dates back 
to the 1959 Cuban Revolution, where the U.S. began promoting Cuban 
democracy through diplomatic and economic isolation.2 Democratization—
protecting human rights and promoting democracy—is integral to U.S. 
foreign policy as it “seeks to end oppression, combat terrorism, and 
advocate democratic ideals and freedoms worldwide.”3 The U.S. has often 
imposed unilateral sanctions against countries to achieve these ends.4   
Various countries, including Cuba and Myanmar/Burma (“Burma”),5 
were subject to such prolonged sanctions by the United States.6 These 
 
 
1.  Peter E. Harrell, Cuba: US Sanctions Policy After the Embargo, CTR. ON GLOBAL ENERGY 
POL’Y 5 (Nov. 2016), http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/Cuba%3A%20US% 
20Sanctions%20Policy%20After%20the%20Embargo.pdf.  
2. See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (1977) (recounting the events 
surrounding the 1959 Cuban Revolution); HUGH THOMAS, CUBA OR THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM (De 
Capo Press 1998) (1971) (discussing the events preceding and following the 1959 Cuban Revolution). 
See also Harrell, supra note 1 (comparing Eisenhower’s “policy of diplomatic and economic isolation” 
with Obama’s engagement policy). 
3. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., STRATEGIC GOAL 7: DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 158 (2006), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/41608.pdf (last visited Mar. 
18, 2018).  
4. Unilateral sanctions are often imposed as a foreign policy tool, covering a range of sanctions from 
“import bans and embargoes to restrictions on U.S. investment and expatriate activity overseas.” Oppose 
Unilateral Economic Sanctions, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/ issue-
brief/oppose-unilateral-economic-sanctions (last updated Aug. 15, 2017) (citing the United States’ 
policy toward Cuba as one example of ineffective unilateral sanctions).  
5. Since 1989 the military and the Burmese government have promoted the name Myanmar for their 
state, but the United States has not adopted that name, opting instead for Burma. CIA, The World 
Factbook: Burma, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_bm.html 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018).  
6.  Joshua L. Savey, Comment, Unilateral Sanctions: An Effective Foreign Policy Tool in 
Myanmar?, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 372 (2014) (explaining that these sanctions are “‘unilateral’ 
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sanctions, however, were recently lifted against Cuba in 2014 and against 
Burma in 2016 under the Obama administration, whose policy sought 
engagement rather than isolation.7 Recent normalization between the U.S. 
and Cuba raises questions concerning the efficacy of economic sanctions to 
achieve democratization, particularly when such measures have unintended 
consequences on the target country’s general population.8 This Note will 
examine the history of U.S. sanctions in these two countries, and their effect 
on economic development and civil liberties.  
Part I presents a historical overview of the U.S. foreign policy sanctions 
imposed on Cuba, which have become increasingly stringent since the end 
of the Cold War. Part II illustrates the Cuban human rights repercussions 
resulting from limited international interaction and resources under the 
embargo, revealing the overall inefficacy of severe economic sanctions. 
Particularly troubling were the implications under the multilateral sanction 
of the Cuban Democracy Act (“CDA”) in 1992.9 Part III explores the details 
regarding the lifted Cuban embargo under the Obama administration. 
Changes to U.S. sanctions have provided benefits to Cuba and the U.S., 
including furthering private-sector growth in Cuba, allowing Americans to 
travel to Cuba, and promoting technological communication throughout the 
island.10  All benefits aside, changes that fully address U.S. interests in 
democratization of Cuba have yet to come to fruition.11 
Additionally, by looking at post-sanction Burma, this Note will make 
suggestions on how to best facilitate democratization in Cuba. Part IV 
provides an overview of Burma’s embargo history. U.S. sanctions on Burma 
date back to 1997, following “rising political repression and human rights 
abuses.”12 Part V examines the progression of human rights in Burma. In 
response to Burma’s ongoing human rights efforts and democratic transition 
with parliamentary elections in 2015, President Obama terminated U.S. 
sanctions on Burma effective on October 7, 2016.13 Part VI discusses the 
Obama administration’s policy developments in Burma following the lifted 
 
 
because one country, or several countries with little or no coordination among them, imposes sanctions 
on a target country”). Countries impose such unilateral sanctions in order to “cut off necessary resources 
to a target country in hopes that the target country will change one or more of its policies . . . .” Id.    
7.  See discussion infra Sections III & VI; see also Pennington, infra note 170.  
8.  Tilahun Weldie Hindeya, Unilateral Trade Sanctions as a Means to Combat Human Rights 
Abuses: Legal and Factual Appraisal, 7 MIZAN L. REV. 101, 102 (2013). It is argued that unilateral trade 
sanctions against World Trade Organization [hereinafter “WTO”] countries on “grounds of human rights 
violations are neither permitted under WTO rules nor effective mechanisms to ensure respect for human 
rights.” Id. at 103.  
9.  For a detailed list of sanctions, see 22 U.S.C. § 6005 (1993).  
10. Harrell, supra note 1.  
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 12.  
13. Id.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
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sanctions, which offers informative context towards sanctions on Cuba.14 
Part VII and VIII assess the effectiveness of the lifted embargo on human 
rights in Cuba using Burma’s change in regime as a model. Part IX 
concludes this Note by finding that while future U.S. foreign policy towards 
Cuba is uncertain, the U.S. should maintain normalized relations, while 
striving to create a more targeted sanctions program if it truly wants to bring 
about unparalleled change through a movement toward democracy in Cuba.   
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE CUBAN EMBARGO: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
SANCTIONS 
On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro successfully ousted President 
Fulgencio Batista and secured power, embarking on a Revolution that 
would deteriorate U.S.-Cuba relations for the next half-century.15 By 1960, 
Castro’s regime had “seized private land, nationalized hundreds of private 
companies . . . and taxed American products . . . .”16 In response to 
nationalization, President Eisenhower invoked the Trading with the Enemy 
Act of 1917 (“TWEA”), which suspended trade with Cuba.17 On October 
19, 1960, Eisenhower prohibited all exports to Cuba, marking the start of 
the Cuban Embargo (referred to as “el Bloqueo” in Cuba).18 The embargo 
continued in 1961 under John F. Kennedy, was tightened in 1991 after the 
Cold War, and was codified into the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act during the Clinton administration.19 
A. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
The early 1960s were marked by hostile U.S. covert operations to 
overthrow Castro’s administration, including the Bay of Pigs invasion and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.20 In 1961, President Kennedy signed the Foreign 
 
 
14. Id. at 12.   
15. Claire Suddath, U.S.-Cuba Relations, TIME (Apr. 15, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/ 
nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html. 
16. Id.  
17. Amnesty Int’l, The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights, AI 
INDEX AMR 25/007/2009 7 (Sept. 2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf. In 
1933, Congress amended section 5(b), granting the President authority to impose embargoes against 
foreign countries during “the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by 
the President.” Id. 
18. Jared K. Carter, Wanna Go to Cuba? New Travel and Trade Rules Provide Unique 
Opportunities for Vermonters, VT. B.J., Spring 2015, at 22. 
19. PATRICK HANEY & WALT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: DOMESTIC POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1, 11-16 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 2005).    
20.  MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43926, CUBA ISSUES AND ACTIONS IN 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”), which authorized the president to impose 
a “total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.”21 On 
February 3, 1962, Kennedy proclaimed a formal embargo against all trade 
with Cuba after several failed attempts to displace Castro.22 Kennedy, 
through Presidential Proclamation 3447, prohibited the “importation into 
the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods imported from 
or through Cuba” and “all exports from the United States to Cuba.”23 
B. THE CUBAN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS OF 1963 
In July 1963, the Department of Treasury, under the authority of TWEA 
and Section 620(a) of the FAA, issued the Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations (“CACR”).24 The CACR prohibits financial and trade 
transactions with Cuba and requires that all exports to Cuba be licensed by 
the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Industry and Security, 
pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979.25 The CACR has been 
amended over the years,26  including loosened travel restrictions imposed in 
1977 under President Carter, and later, the tightening of travel regulations 
under George W. Bush’s administration.27  
From 1963 through 1975, “a near total embargo was imposed,” whereby 
U.S. foreign subsidiaries were prohibited from trading with Cuba.28 On July 
26, 1964, multilateral sanctions were also imposed by the Organization of 
American States “(OAS”), who then lifted their eleven-year embargo 
against Cuba in August 1975, prompting the Ford administration to relax 
Cuban trade restrictions.29 Carter became the first president to attempt to 
 
 
THE 114TH CONGRESS 22 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43926.pdf.  
21.  Act for International Development of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 
87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 424, 444-45 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1988)). 
22.  Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 3, 1962). 
23.  Id. 
24.  SULLIVAN, supra note 20. 
25.  Id. at 22-23.  
26.  Id. at 28-50. 
27.  MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31139, CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON 
TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 1, 18 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31139.pdf.  
28.  Kam S. Wong, Comment, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: The Extraterritorial Scope 
of 1706(a), 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 651, 654 (1994).  
29.  Id. at 655. See also Brianna Lee & Danielle Renwick, The Organization of American 
States, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american-
states (last updated May 17, 2017) (defining the Organization of American States as a “multilateral 
regional organization focused on human rights, electoral oversight, social and economic development, 
and security in the Western Hemisphere” and discussing its importance as a “forum for regional 
diplomacy”); David Binder, Cuba Sanctions, Imposed in 1964, Lifted by O.A.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 
1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/07/30/archives/cuba-sanctions-imposed-in-1964-lifted-by-oas-
vote-at-costa-rica.html (explaining how the OAS abolished an 11-year embargo imposed “as a penalty 
for fostering Communist guerilla activities in the hemisphere”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
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normalize relations with Cuba after the mutual U.S.-Cuba hostility in the 
decades following the missile crisis.30 
C. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act  
Ronald Reagan’s administration ended all attempts to accommodate 
Cuba because it was still under Castro’s authoritarian rule. Reagan and his 
successors, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, advocated 
increased pressure on Cuba by strengthening the embargo in an effort to 
bring about a democratic political reform after Cuba undertook drastic 
economic reform following the collapse of the Soviet Union.31 In 1992 
Congress passed the CDA, which prohibited all foreign-based subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, traveling to Cuba by U.S. 
citizens, and family remittances to Cuba.32     
Because the CDA imposed severe penalties on U.S. subsidiaries 
operating in foreign countries trading with Cuba, many foreign nations 
objected on grounds that it would ultimately hurt their economic interests, 
potentially appropriating their authority to implement necessary laws.33 As 
a result, many U.S. allies—such as the United Kingdom and Canada—
enacted laws preventing U.S. subsidiaries wishing to trade with Cuba from 
operating within their territories.34 Despite all of its restrictions, the CDA 
also sought to bring humanitarian aid to Cuba through food donations,35 
medical supply exports,36 postal infrastructure,37 and assistance to support 
 
 
30. WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE & PETER KORNBLUH, BACK CHANNEL TO CUBA: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HAVANA 169-172 (Univ. of North Carolina 
Press 2015). On March 15, 1977, Carter issued a presidential directive (NSC-6), through which his 
administration began talks with Cuba to “set in motion a process which will lead to the reestablishment 
of diplomatic relations.” HANNA S. KASSAB & JONATHAN D. ROSEN, THE OBAMA DOCTRINE IN THE 
AMERICAS 30 (Hanna S. Kassab & Jonathan D. Rosen eds., Lexington Books 2016). 
31.  KASSAB & ROSEN, supra note 30.  
32. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified as amended at 
22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (2006)). For a detailed list of sanctions see 22 U.S.C. § 6005 (1993).  
33. Wong, supra note 28, at 651 (explaining that the CDA caused “great international concern and 
protest”). 
34. Luisette Gierbolini, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with International Law 
and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289, 295 (1997) (maintaining that the 
CDA “was violative of international law”). 
35. See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(b) (1992) (“Nothing in this or any other Act shall prohibit donations of 
food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals in Cuba.”). 
36.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(c) (1992) (“Exports of medicines or medical supplies, instruments, 
or equipment to Cuba shall not be restricted.”). 
37.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(f) (1992) (“The United States Postal Service shall take such actions 
as are necessary to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba, including, in the absence of common 
carrier service between the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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democracy.38  
D. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 
(Helms-Burton Act) 
Hostility continued to ensue during the Clinton administration with the 
passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 
(“Libertad”), also known as the Helms-Burton Act.39 Libertad was enacted 
after the Cuban Air Force shot down two American civilian planes.40 The 
purpose of the Act was to strengthen the embargo, encourage democratic 
elections in Cuba, assist in a transition towards a democratically elected 
government, and to safeguard Americans’ property rights.41 
Title I of Libertad strengthened the economic embargo by: prohibiting 
the indirect financing of Cuba,42 opposing Cuban membership in 
international financial institutions and reducing payments to institutions that 
provide loans or other assistance to Cuba,43 removing Cuba from the OAS,44 
blocking the importation of Cuban-made commodities,45 and prohibiting the 
importation of one of Cuba’s most important export industries – sugar.46 
Title II intended to achieve democracy in Cuba, suspending the economic 
embargo upon a presidential determination that a democratically elected 
government came into power in Cuba.47 
 
E. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement 
Act (“TSRA”) in 2000, which eased export restrictions in Cuba by allowing 
“the sale of agricultural goods and medicine to Cuba for humanitarian 
 
 
38.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6004(g) (1992) (“The United States Government may provide assistance, 
through appropriate nongovernmental organizations, for the support of individuals and organizations to 
promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba.”). 
39.  Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091(1996)).  
40.  Tim Bearden, Helms-Burton Act: Resurrecting the Iron Curtain, COUNCIL ON 
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (June 10, 2011), http://www.coha.org/helms-burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-
curtain/.  
41.  Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1996).  
42.  Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6033.  
43.  Id. at § 6034. 
44.  Id. at § 6035. 
45.  Id. at § 6040. 
46.  Id. at § 6040(c).  
47.  Id. at § 6061, § 6064.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
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reasons.”48 Consequently, the U.S. became Cuba’s fourth largest trading 
partner.49 However, unlike Iranian, Libyan, or Sudanese sales, Cuban 
exports required either cash-in-advance payments or funding by a third-
country financial institution.50  
F. Cuba’s Relation with Foreign Nations 
Despite recurring sanctions and limited foreign policy affairs with the 
U.S., Cuba has nevertheless strengthened relations with other international 
players.51 For instance, since Raul Castro became the provisional president, 
Havana has “hosted over seventy heads of state.”52 International relations, 
however, have not advanced economic globalization in Cuba.53 
II. THE EMBARGO’S EFFECT ON CUBA’S DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
While the purported goal of the embargo was to achieve democracy in 
Cuba, it nevertheless had negative effects on the country overall, causing 
human rights violations of an economic, social, and cultural nature.54 
Depriving Cuba of new medicines and technologies and imposing a 
coercive multilateral embargo caused “grave, systematic violations of 
 
 
48.  See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 17, at 11. See also REMY JURENAS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., IB10061, EXEMPTING FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PRODUCTS FROM U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION, Summary (2005) (explaining that the incentive for the U.S. Congress 
to enact legislation “exempting foods and agricultural commodities from U.S. sanctions” originated from 
the “[f]alling agricultural exports and declining commodity prices”).  
49.  C. Parr Rosson, III & Flynn J. Adcock, Emerging Markets for U.S. Agriculture: Focus on 
Cuba, TEX. A&M AGRILIFE EXTENSION SERV., at 1, http://cnas.tamu.edu/Publications/E312.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
50.  John B. Reynolds, III et al., Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 37 INT’L LAW. 263, 
268 (2003) (noting that “Congressional efforts to remove these financing restrictions failed”). These 
financial institutions had to be outside the United States and Cuba. Id.  
51.  Daniel P. Erikson & Paul J. Wander, Cuba's Brave New World, FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF., Fall 2009, at 9, 10. In 2009, China was Cuba’s second largest trading partner, Latin American 
diplomats withdrew Cuba’s suspension from the Organization of American States, Africa admired 
Cuba’s solidarity and medical diplomacy, Canadian relations remained strong, and the European Union 
engaged in new normalcy discussions with Cuba. Id. at 9-10. 
52.  Id. at 9. Such high-profile leaders include “Hu Jintao of China, Dmitry Medvedev of 
Russia, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil.” Id. 
53.  Cuba is far from globalization, ranking 136th out of 207 on the overall Globalization Index 
and 166th out of 207 in terms of economic globalization. See 2015 KOF Index of Globalization, KOF 
1-3 (2015), http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/rankings_2015.pdf. 
54. BERTA ESPERANZA HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN JOSEPH POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW 
COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 265 (New York Univ. Press 2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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human rights . . . in violation of international law.”55  
A. Economic Impact  
The embargo has negatively impacted the Cuban economy, with 
estimates totaling around $86 billion.56 The relaxation of sanctions against 
food and medicines in 2000 allowed Cuba to rise from the 138th in 2001 to 
the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural exports in 2006, with exports 
totaling $328 million.57 Though Cuba has gained more access to needed 
exports, its overall gross domestic product (GDP), has room for faster 
growth.58 Nevertheless, Raul Castro’s liberalization of Cuba's state-
controlled economy provides potential for growth.59 
B. Socioeconomic Development – Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index (“HDI”) is an annual composite statistic 
presented by the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) used for 
assessing progress in life expectancy, education, and standard of living.60 
According to the UNDP, Cuba’s HDI value for 2015 was 0.775, placing the 
 
 
55. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Hum. Rts., The Adverse 
Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, 52d Sess., ¶ 98-100, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (June 21, 2000) (prepared by Marc J. Bossuyt). 
56. See HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 54, at 271. These estimates include the loss 
of export earnings, additional import costs, and a suppression of economic growth. Id.  
57. Id.  
58. See CIA, Cuba, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cu.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2018) (explaining that Cuban GDP growth (at purchasing 
power parity) per capita ranks 126th out of 230 countries); MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43926, CUBA ISSUES AND ACTIONS IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 11 (2015), 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R43926.pdf (“Since 2010, growth has 
improved modestly, averaging almost 2.5% growth during the period, although growth was just 1.3% in 
2014 because of Cuba’s challenges in shifting from a centrally planned to a more decentralized 
economy.”); THE WORLD BANK, Cuba, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP 
.CD?locations=CU (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (demonstrating that Cuba’s GDP has steadily risen, 
totaling $87 billion in 2015); But see, THE WORLD BANK, United States, https://data.worldbank.org 
/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2015&locations=US&start=1960 (demonstrating that the United 
States has a GDP of around $18 trillion) (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
59. See Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 (last updated Jan. 19, 2018). Reforms included 
“decentralizing the agricultural sector, relaxing restrictions on small businesses, liberalizing real estate 
markets, making it easier for Cubans to obtain permission to travel abroad, and expanding access 
to consumer goods.” Id.  
60. U.N. HUMAN DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: CUBA, at 2, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/CUB.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income [hereinafter “GNI”] per capita. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
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country at the 68th position among 188 nations.61 
C. Health  
While the passage of the CDA loosened the embargo on medicine,62 
access to specialized medical equipment and chemical components became 
virtually impossible because the CDA also prohibited foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.63 Because of the laborious 
licensing process required to purchase medical products, the Cuban 
government claims that “between June 2004 and April 2005, the embargo 
cost Cuba $75.7 million in public health damages alone.”64 Although life 
expectancy has increased to 79 years,65 Cuba’s scarce medical equipment 
and supplies have hindered technological innovation, curtailed preventative 
methods,66 and affected treatment for children,67 transplant patients,68 
dialysis patients,69 and cancer patients.70  
 
 
61. Between 1990 and 2015, Cuba’s life expectancy increased by 5.0 years, the mean years of 
schooling increased by 3.3 years, and the GNI per capita increased by 52.0 percent. Id.   
62. Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health & Nutrition in Cuba, 
AM. ASSOC. FOR WORLD HEALTH, Mar. 1997, at 6, http://medicc.org/ns/documents/The_impact_ 
of_the_U.S._Embargo_on_Health_&_Nutrition_in_Cuba.pdf.  
63. Id.   
64. Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the 
Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 199, 241 (2007). 
65. See U.N. HUMAN DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 60, at 3. Cuba’s life expectancy at birth has 
steadily increased from 74.6 in 1990 to 79.6 in 2015. Id.  
66. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 17, at 18 (refusing to “renew a license to health organization 
Population Services International (PSI) to export condoms to Cuba for distribution to groups at high of 
contracting HIV” and preventing programs to fight HIV/AIDS even when implemented by UN 
agencies). 
67. Id. In their 2008 report, UNICEF reported that: Cuba was unable to import nutritional products 
for children, which contributed to the high prevalence of iron deficiency, affecting 37.5% of children in 
2007. Id. “The number of children suffering from heart conditions who are waiting for appropriate 
treatment at a [pediatric] hospital has increased after Cuba was unable to buy from the US- based 
companies the necessary medical equipment for their treatment.” Id.   
68. See U.N. Secretary-General, Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial 
embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/61/132 (Aug. 8, 
2006) (noting the lack of access to medical technology in Cuba as a result of the embargo). Because the 
U.S. Department of Treasury denied permission, America’s “Atlantic Philanthropic Service Co. was 
prevented from donating a molecular biology laboratory to Cuba’s Nephrology Institute,” which would 
have “increased the survival rate among patients receiving kidney transplants.” Id.    
69. Id. at ¶ 90. “Leading international companies in the sector, such as the United States firm Baxter, 
were prevented from responding to requests from Cuba to provide continuous ambulatory peritoneal 
dialysis.” Id.  
70. Coll, supra note 64, at 243 (denying “film for x-ray machines used to detect breast cancer, 
Spanish-language medical books from a U.S. conglomerate subsidiary, and U.S.-made components for 
respirators”).  
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D. Education  
According to the CIA World Factbook, as of 2010, Cuba ranks second 
in the world for education expenditures, with expenses making up 12.8% of 
the total GDP.71 Adult literacy, defined as the population over age 15 who 
can read and write, was 99.8% in Cuba.72 Nonetheless, by eliminating 
access to products manufactured in the U.S., the embargo contributes to 
high educational expenditures due to the increased cost of procuring school 
supplies.73 
E. Travel Restrictions  
In 2004, the CACR was amended, imposing stricter sanctions and travel 
restrictions on Cuba.74 The amendment narrowed the category of relatives 
allowed to be visited,75 restricted travel to once every three years for no 
more than fourteen days,76 required a specific license in order to visit Cuba, 
eliminated additional visits,77 restricted remittances to immediate family 
members,78 and reduced remittance amounts travelers could bring.79 
 
 
 
 
71. Cuba, The World Factbook, supra note 58. 
72. Id. But see, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, Literacy - The World Factbook - CIA, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/WorldStats/CIA-World-Factbook-Literacy.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2017) (listing the United States as twenty-eighth with a literacy rate of 99%).  
73. See Coll, supra note 64, at 244. In 2006, the Cuban government, in its report to the United 
Nations General Assembly, noted that supplies “indispensable to art schools (violins, pianos, double 
basses, flutes, ballet pointed and half-pointed shoes, maillots and leotards) have had to be purchased in 
third countries, at an additional cost of 16% or $2.5 million.” Id. Furthermore, the University of Havana 
paid $40,000 a year for Internet bandwidth because “it was denied access to the sub-aquatic fiber-optic 
cable.” Id.  
74. See 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2002).  
75. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.561 (2015). See also Recent OFAC Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
(June 16, 2004), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/200 
40616.aspx (narrowing the definition of “close relative” by replacing it with the term “member of a 
person’s immediate family”). 
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 75 (replacing the once-per-twelve-months general 
license contained in former paragraph (a) of Section 515.561 with “specific licenses authorizing travel-
related transactions incident to visits to members of a person's immediate family who are nationals of 
Cuba once per three-year period and for no more than 14 days”).  
77. Id. Former paragraph (b) of Section 515.561, eliminates specific licenses for additional visits, 
thus “no additional visits [are] authorized.” Id.   
78. Id.  
79. Id. The new limit under the amended CACR is “$50 per day plus up to an additional $50 per 
trip, if needed, to pay for transportation-related expenses in Cuba that exceed the $50 per day limit” 
compared to the prior $167 limit “plus any additional funds needed for transactions that were directly 
incident to visiting that relative.” Id.  
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F. Shift in Regime  
Since Fidel Castro relinquished governmental control to his brother, 
Raul, Cuba has “signaled a willingness to reconsider its long-standing 
disregard for human rights.”80 In February 2008, Cuba signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), thereby recognizing core international human rights 
principles.81 In response to this and other economic reforms, the European 
Union lifted sanctions on Cuba in June 2008.82 
G. Freedom of Expression  
Despite some progress under Raul Castro, by 2009 the Cuban 
government continued to maintain a media monopoly, making freedom of 
expression virtually nonexistent.83 Access to electronic information was 
highly regulated; the only  internet café in Havana, the nation's capital, 
charged five U.S. dollars per hour, which was “one-third of the average 
monthly salary in Cuba.”84 In May 2013, a governmental decree expanded 
internet access, but its broad conditions essentially impeded access to any 
critics of the Cuban government.85  
H. Political Imprisonment  
In 2008, the Cuban government increased the use of arbitrary detention 
to intimidate individuals from participating in events viewed as critical of 
 
 
80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Cuba: Events of 2008, in WORLD REPORT 2009,  
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/cuba (last visited Nov. 25, 2017) 
[hereinafter Cuba: Events of 2008]. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Cuba: Events of 2015, in WORLD REPORT 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/cuba (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Cuba: Events of 2015].  “In November 2013, Cuba was re-elected to a regional position on the UN 
Human Rights Council, despite its poor human rights record.” Id. “As a member of the council, Cuba 
has regularly voted to prevent scrutiny of serious human rights abuses around the world, opposing 
resolutions spotlighting abuses in North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine.” Id. 
83. Cuba: Events of 2008, supra note 80.  
84. Id.  
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Cuba: Events of 2013, in WORLD REPORT 2014, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/cuba (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Cuba: Events of 2013]. The May 2013 government decree stipulates that Internet access cannot be used 
for activities that undermine “‘public security, the integrity, the economy, independence, and national 
security’ of Cuba.’” Id.  
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the government, such as peaceful marches or meetings.86 From January 
through October 2015, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and 
National Reconciliation (“CCDHRN”), a Cuban human rights group, 
received over 6,200 reports of arbitrary detentions in 2013, compared to 
approximately 9,940 in 2016.87 Family members of political prisoners  also 
continue to be “harassed and blacklisted from jobs.”88   
III. CUBA’S LIFTED SANCTIONS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
On December 17, 2014, Barack Obama and Raul Castro announced that 
the U.S. and Cuba would restore full diplomatic ties.89 According to 
President Obama, “after all, these fifty years have shown that isolation has 
not worked.”90 In addition to both countries releasing prisoners,91 the United 
States agreed to further ease restrictions on remittances and travel, 
“allowing Cuban Americans to send unlimited funds into Cuba and 
permitting U.S. Citizens to travel to Cuba for religious and educational 
purposes.”92 On December 16, 2016, the U.S. and Cuba reached a “bilateral 
civil aviation arrangement,” allowing “commercial airlines to operate 
regular flights to Cuba” for the first time in more than fifty years.93 The new 
rules have also eased previously imposed economic sanctions by allowing: 
“travelers to use U.S. credit and debit cards; U.S. insurance companies to 
cover health, life, and travel insurance for individuals living in or visiting 
Cuba; banks to facilitate authorized transactions; U.S. companies to invest 
in some small businesses; and shipment of building materials to private 
 
 
86. See Cuba: Events of 2008, supra note 80.      
87. See Cuba: Events of 2015, supra note 82 (documenting “more than 6,200 reports of arbitrary 
detentions from January through October 2015”); Felter & Renwick, supra note 59 (“[T]he Cuban 
Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation documented a total of 9,940 arbitrary 
detentions [in 2016].”).  
88. See Cuba: Events of 2008, supra note 80. Family members of political prisoners, namely wives, 
were also detained. In April 2008, the Ladies in White, wives of political prisoners, were arrested when 
they tried to “stage a peaceful sit-in in Havana’s Revolution Plaza.” Id. See also Cuba: Events of 2013, 
supra note 85. On August 25, 2013, more than 30 Ladies in White were “detained and beaten after 
attending Sunday mass.” Id.  
89. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 59.  
90.  Address to the Nation on United States Policy Toward Cuba, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
937 (Dec. 17, 2014).  
91. See SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 25 (noting two developments in U.S.-Cuban relations: first, 
Cuba released Alan Gross on humanitarian grounds after five years of imprisonment, and second, Cuba 
released “‘one of the most important intelligence assets that the United States has ever had in Cuba’ in 
exchange for three Cuban intelligence agents who had been imprisoned in the United States since 
1998”). See also KASSAB & ROSEN, supra note 30, at 32 (noting that “Cuba agreed to release fifty-three 
prisoners that the U.S. had classified as political dissidents”). 
92. Felter & Renwick, supra note 59. 
93. See SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 34. See also Felter & Renwick, supra note 59 (noting that in 
early 2016 “commercial U.S. airlines began offering service between the countries . . . .”). 
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Cuban companies.”94 Unfortunately,  these lifted sanctions on the part of the 
United States might prove to be short lived.  
In an effort to obtain additional concessions from the Cuban government, 
President Trump announced in June 2017 that he was re-imposing the lifted 
embargo.95 President Trump subsequently signed a directive that would 
reinstate travel and commercial restrictions.96 The directive, however, will 
not eliminate the diplomatic ties that the Obama administration re-opened 
in 2015.97 Under the directive, American tourists will be prevented from 
freely visiting the island in an individual capacity,98 and U.S. “companies 
and citizens will be barred from doing business with any firm controlled by 
the Cuban military or its intelligence or security services.”99 
IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: UNITED STATES AND BURMA RELATIONS 
Burma, like Cuba, was subject to prolonged U.S. sanctions in response 
to a military dictatorship that disregarded Burmese human rights and civil 
liberties. In 1948, after the assassination of nationalist leader General Aung 
San, Burma declared independence after over a century of British colonial 
rule.100 Pro-democracy activists consider the period from 1948 to 1962 as 
Burma's “democratic era.”101 Such representative democracy lasted until the 
 
 
94. KASSAB & ROSEN, supra note 30, at 32.  
95. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Reverses Pieces of Obama-Era Engagement With Cuba, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/politics/cuba-trump-engagement-
restrictions.html. President Trump stated that the United States would not “be silent in the face of 
communist oppression any longer.” Id.  
96. Id.  
97. Gabrielle Levy, Trump Orders Travel, Trade Restrictions on Cuba Tightened, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (June 15, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-06-
15/donald-trump-signs-directive-undoing-obama-era-loosening-of-cuba-travel-trade-restrictions. 
Embassies in Washington and Havana will remain open and travel-based commercial institutions – i.e. 
cruises and airlines – will remain open. Davis, supra note 95. 
98. Americans are currently able to travel to Cuba, but the Trump administration plans to heavily 
regulate the easily accessible “people-to-people” visa created during the Obama administration. Levy, 
supra note 97. 
99. Davis, supra note 95. See also Gardiner Harris, Trump Tightens Cuba Embargo, Restricting 
Access to Hotels and Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/us/politics/trump-tightens-cuba-embargo-restricting-access-to-
hotels-businesses.html (“The Trump administration on [November 8, 2017] tightened the economic 
embargo on Cuba, restricting Americans from access to hotels, stores and other businesses tied to the 
Cuban military.”).  
100. Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Understanding Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385 (last updated Mar. 25, 2016). 
101. Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions 
Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 455, 473 
(2008). The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) “controlled the political arena and was 
victorious in the parliamentary elections of 1947, 1951, and 1956. The collapse of the AFPFL produced 
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military coup of 1962, led by General U Ne Win, who would hold power 
for the next twenty-six years.102  
A. Ne Win’s Socialist Regime (1962-1988)  
On March 2, 1962, the Revolutionary Council headed by General Ne 
Win usurped power and established the “Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar,”103 which nationalized the economy, formed the single-party 
state that became known as the Burma Socialist Programme Party 
(“BSPS”), and banned independent newspapers.104 “[T]he Burmese way to 
socialism” led to the “nationalization of all major foreign and domestically 
owned businesses,” isolating Burma from “the international community.”105 
Despite economic growth in Southeast Asia, the UN declared Burma a 
“Least Developed Country” in 1987.106  
B. Political Impasse – the 1988 Anti-Government Riots and the 1990 
Election 
By 1988, “widespread corruption and food shortages led to mass 
protests.”107 In response, the military junta “killed thousands and 
reorganized into the State Law and Order Restoration Council” 
(“SLORC”).108 During the 1990 national “elections,” Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi, who would later be detained, led the main opposition party — the 
National League of Democracy (“NLD”) — that won Burma's elections, but 
SLORC refused to transfer power.109 The military junta maintained tight 
 
 
a military caretaker government between 1958 and 1960, which culminated in U Nu's faction winning 
the 1960 elections over the military-supported faction.” Id.     
102.  Xu & Albert, supra note 100. Ne Win’s party established a ruling council comprised almost 
entirely from the armed forces. Id. In 1974, Ne Win instituted a new constitution “based on an isolationist 
policy with a socialist economic program that nationalized Burma’s major enterprises.” Id.  
103.  See Nyun, supra note 101, at 474.  
104. Myanmar profile – Timeline, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-pacific-12992883.  
105. Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights, 5 
NW. J. INT’L RTS. 153, 154 (2007). See also Nyun, supra note 101, at 474 (arguing that BSPP’s self-
imposed isolation from the international community cut off “trade as well as other social contracts with 
the outside world”).  
106.  See Ewing-Chow, supra note 105.  
107.  Xu & Albert, supra note 100 (noting that on August 8, 1988, the army opened fire on 
dissidents, “killing at least three thousand, and displacing thousands more”). See also Nyun, supra note 
101, at 475 (describing “civilians from all walks of life [taking] to the streets and peacefully march[ing] 
for change” only to be gunned down).  
108. Audrey Tan, Note, Myanmar's Transitional Justice: Addressing A Country's Past in A Time of 
Change, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (2012). 
109. See Nyun, supra note 101, at 475-76 (“Faced with both domestic and world-wide criticism of 
its violent usurpation of power, SLORC promised to hold national elections to reconstitute the general 
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control well into the 2000s, eventually changing its name to the State Peace 
and Development Council.110 Problems continued into the twenty-first 
century, with Burmese monk demonstrations under the “Saffron 
Revolution” in 2007 and Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.111 
C. The U.S. Response – Foreign Policy Sanctions 
1. 1990: The Customs and Trade Act  
In response to SLORC’s post-election restrictions, the U.S. Senate and 
Congress passed the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (“CTA”), which 
required the President to impose economic sanctions against Burma if 
specified conditions were not met.112 On April 13, 1989, President Bush 
suspended Burma’s eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences 
program (“GSP”), and he designated Burma as a drug-trafficking country 
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”) on February of the 
following year.113 After the CTA was passed, the Bush administration 
subsequently invoked the law’s authority and refused to renew the Bilateral 
Textile Agreement with Burma, which had expired on December 31, 
1990.114 
 
 
assembly as the first step in restoring democracy,” . . . but “nullified the results of the 1990 national 
election.”). Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest numerous times and was detained in 
2003 until her subsequent release in 2010. See BBC NEWS, supra note 104. 
110.  See Tan, supra note 108, at 1647 (“Between 1988 and 2000, the junta tripled the size of its 
armed forces and launched campaigns against ethnic militia. Political freedoms were also tightly 
limited.”). 
111.  Id. (criticizing the Burmese government for its failure to provide international aid when 
Cyclone Nargis hit causing a humanitarian crisis).  
112. See Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, § 138, 104 Stat. 629 (1990). Section 
138 granted the President the authority to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President 
determines to be appropriate, including any sanctions appropriate under the Narcotics Control Trade Act 
of 1986.” Id.; see also MICHAEL F. MARTIN, R41336, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. SANCTIONS ON 
BURMA 1 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf (requiring the President to impose “‘such 
economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be appropriate,’ unless the President 
certifies certain conditions pertaining to human rights and counternarcotics have been met”). 
113. See MARTIN, supra note 112, at 12-13; Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,  https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/266/~/generalized-
system-of-preferences-%28gsp%29 (last updated Nov. 13, 2015) (describing the GSP as a “trade 
program designed to promote economic growth in the developing world by providing preferential duty-
free entry for up to 4,800 products from 129 designated beneficiary countries and territories.”). 
114.  See MARTIN, supra note 112, at 13 n.40 (stating that the U.S. and Burma had a bilateral textile 
agreement covering selected articles of apparel from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1990). It should 
also be noted that Congress considered various bills during the 1990s that would impose sanctions 
against Burma. Id. at 13. For example, “[o]n April 30, 1994, Congress passed the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act . . . which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and withheld a portion of 
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2. 1996: The Federal Burma Statute  
Congress enacted the Federal Burma Statute in 1996, which imposed 
“mandatory sanctions against [Burma] for human rights violations and 
authorized the president to bar new investment in [Burma] by U.S. nationals 
if the president found either specified acts against the person of Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi or ‘large-scale repression of or violence against the democratic 
opposition.’”115 
3. 1997: The Foreign Operations Act  
In May 1997, the Clinton administration declared a national emergency, 
as required by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”),116 and imposed further sanctions under the 1997 Foreign 
Operations Act (“FOA”),117 which granted the President the discretion to 
prohibit any “new investment” in Burma.118 The FOA approved new 
sanctions,119 including a ban on entry visas for Burmese government 
officials120 and instructions for international financial institutions to vote 
against Burmese funding.121  
4. 2003: The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act  
In response to an alleged SLORC-instigated attack on Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi and her ultimate imprisonment, the Burmese Freedom and 
 
 
U.S. contributions to international organizations with programs for Burma, including the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) . . . .” Id.  
115.  See Nyun, supra note 101, at 480. 
116.  Id.  
117.  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (1997) (codified as amended at the Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172 (1997)).  
118. Adrienne S. Khorasanee, Note, Sacrificing Burma to Save Free Trade: The Burma Freedom 
Act and the World Trade Organization, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1302, 1302 n.55 (2002) (quoting 
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 369 (2000)) (defining “new investment” as 
“[e]ntry into a contract that would favor the ‘economical development of resources in Burma,’ or would 
provide ownership interests in or benefits from such development . . . but the term specifically excludes 
. . . ‘entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or 
technology.”’). 
119.  See MARTIN, supra note 112. 
120.  Proclamation No. 6925, 3 C.F.R. 74 (1997) (suspending visas for “persons who formulate, 
implement, or benefit from policies that impede Burma’s transition to democracy, and the immediate 
family members of such persons” under Clinton’s Presidential Proclamation). 
121.  See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act, supra 
note 117, § 570(a)(2) (requiring federal representatives of international financial institutions to vote 
against any proposed financial assistance to Burma). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
  
 
 
 
 
2018]                DEMOCRATIZATION IN CUBA AND BURMA                   519 
 
 
 
 
Democracy Act of 2003 (“BFDA”) was enacted.122 The BFDA, alongside 
President George W. Bush’s Executive Order,123 requires the President to 
impose a ban on Burmese imported products,124 freeze assets of certain 
Burmese officials,125 block U.S. support for loans from international 
financial institutions,126 and ban visas for certain Burmese officials,127 while 
allowing the President to waive any provision deemed contrary to “national 
security interests.”128 The BFDA also provides that the ban will remain in 
effect until the SPDC has made “substantial and measurable progress to end 
violations of internationally recognized human rights including rape129 . . . 
and toward implementing a democratic government.”130  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 2008: The Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts (JADE) Act 
The JADE Act of 2008 (“JADE”)131 was not passed by Congress until 
 
 
122.  Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§ 1-9, 117 Stat. 864 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).  
123.  Exec. Order No. 13,310, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,853 (July 28, 2003). 
124.  See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, § 3(a)(1) (“[T]he President shall ban the 
importation of any article that is a product of Burma.”). 
125.  See Presidential Statement on Signing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, 
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 990 (Jul. 28, 2003) (“The Executive order freezes the assets of senior 
Burmese officials and bans virtually all remittances to Burma. By denying these rulers the hard currency 
they use to fund their repression, we are providing strong incentives for democratic change and human 
rights in Burma.”).  
126.  See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, § 5 (“[T]he Secretary of the Treasury 
shall instruct the United States executive director to each appropriate international financial institution 
in which the United States participates, to oppose, and vote against the extension by such institution of 
any loan or financial or technical assistance to Burma . . . .”).  
127.  See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, § 6(a) (“The President is authorized to 
deny visas and deny entry to the former and present leadership of the SPDC or the Union Solidarity 
Development Association.”).  
128.  See Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, § 3(b) (“The President may waive the 
provisions described in this section for any or all articles that are a product of Burma . . . .”). The 
President may waive provisions if he or she “determines . . . that to do so is in the national interest of 
the United States.” Id.  
129.  See id. § 3(a)(3)(A). 
130.  See id. § 3(a)(3)(B). A democratic government would include the “releas[e] [of] all political 
prisoners; allowing freedom of speech and the press; allowing freedom of association; permitting the 
peaceful exercise of religion; and . . . democratic elections under the rule of law.” Id.  
131.  Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
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the SPDC crushed a nationwide protest known as the “Saffron 
Revolution.”132  The Act bans the import of products containing Burmese 
jadeite and rubies,133 expands the list of Burmese officials subjected to visa 
bans134 and financial sanctions,135 and allows restrictions on correspondent 
accounts.136  
D. THE RISE OF A CIVILIAN PARLIAMENT WITH THE 2011 DEMISE OF 
THE JUNTA 
In 2011, after years of turmoil and military control, Burma began to see 
signs of real change when the military junta officially dissolved and 
established a civilian parliament, thereby appointing then-Prime Minister 
Thein Sein as President.137 Thein Sein’s administration organized various 
reforms, including “amnesty for most political prisoners, relaxation of 
censorship, establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, and 
efforts toward peace with ethnic rebel groups.”138 Such changes led Aung 
San Suu Kyi’s party (NLD) to compete and win in by-elections, but the 
NLD only filled a small proportion of seats in parliament, controlling “less 
than one-tenth of the body.”139 Then in 2012, the parliament passed a new 
foreign investment law that “opened up overseas ownership of business 
 
 
No. 110-286, 122 Stat. 2632 [hereinafter “Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act”]. 
132.  See MARTIN, supra note 112, at 14 (attributing the protests to Buddhist monks in the autumn 
of 2007).  
133.  See Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act, §2(7) (“In 2006, the Burmese regime earned more 
than $500 million from oil and gas projects, over $500 million from sale of hardwoods, and in excess of 
$300 million from the sale of rubies and jade . . . over $100 million annually in Burmese rubies and jade 
enters the United States.”).  
134.  See id. §5(a)(1) (restricting visa for travel to the United States to “[f]ormer and present leaders 
of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA” that are “involved in the repression of peaceful 
political activity or in other gross violations of human rights in Burma or in the commission of other 
human rights abuses, including any current or former officials of the security services and judicial 
institutions of the SPDC”).  
135.  See id. §5(b). 
136.  See id. §5(c)(1) (“The Secretary of the Treasury . . . may prohibit or impose conditions on the 
opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by 
any financial institution . . . .”). The Secretary may prohibit or impose such if they determine that the 
correspondent account might be used “by a foreign banking institution that holds property or an interest 
in property belonging to the SPDC . . . [or] to conduct a transaction on behalf of the SPDC . . . .” Id.   
137.  See Tan, supra note 108, at 1648 (noting that since Sein was sworn in and replaced the military 
junta, the government has “moved swiftly toward democratization, breaking sharply from the highly 
centralized and erratic policies of the past”). See also Xu & Albert, supra note 100. While the Thein 
Sein administration saw a period of reform, many top officials in the new administration were former 
military officers, “leading to concerns about continued military dominance.” Id.  
138.  See Xu & Albert, supra note 100. 
139.  Id. “Under the 2008 constitution, 25 percent of the parliament’s seats are reserved for the 
military, and the military-backed USDP continues to control seats in the powerful defense, home affairs, 
and border affairs ministries.” Id.  
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ventures and offered tax breaks.”140 Such reforms led to international 
powers reestablishing ties with Burma.141  
V. THE EMBARGO’S EFFECT ON BURMA’S DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
Despite an improved environment for freedom of expression and media 
that accompanied the change from military to civilian rule, important human 
rights violations remain.142 While there have been some human rights 
advancements, the “military retains autonomy from civilian oversight and 
extensive power over issues of national security” under their 2008 
constitution.143 Over the years, the junta has been accused of committing 
serious human rights violations including “forced labor, the use of child 
soldiers, forced relocation, summary executions, torture and the rape of 
women and girls, particularly of members of ethnic minorities.”144 
 
A. Economic Impact  
U.S. sanctions have “systematically weakened the [Burmese] economy 
by limiting trade, investment and foreign aid.”145 As a result of sanctions, 
 
 
140.  Id. According to the World Bank, Burma’s “net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
increased from $900 million in 2010 to $2.3 billion in 2013 . . . .” Id. In March 2015, the FDI grew to 
be more than $8 billion, “twenty-five times the amount received the year before the military ceded power 
in 2010.” Id.  
141.  Id. Global powers (i.e. the United States, European Union, Australia, and Japan) began to drop 
previous economic sanctions against Burma. Id. Multinational companies also began showing interest 
in Burma’s investment. Id. For the first time in twenty years, the UK Prime Minister, Davis Cameron, 
visited the country. Id. The World Bank also “subsequently embarked $245 million in credit and grant 
funding for the country, marking the first international lending to the nation in twenty-five years.” Id.  
142.  Burma, Asia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/asia/burma (last visited Mar. 18, 
2018) (detailing increased discrimination and threats to the Rohingya Muslim minority since the 
civilian-led government took office in March 2016). See also Burma: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, infra note 154 (“The political transition began promisingly, with the April [2016] release of 
over 200 political prisoners and detainees. Nonetheless, the NLD-led government has thus far not 
capitalized on its initial momentum in guiding the country toward substantive reform or the creation of 
democratic institutions.”). The government, however, faced new challenges, including “constitutional 
empowerment of the military, repressive legislation, weak rule of law, and a corrupt judiciary.” Id. 
143.  Burma: Government Forces Implicated in Killings and Rape, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 
12, 2017, 10:00AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/burma-government-forces-implicated-
killings-and-rape.  
144.  See Ewing-Chow, supra note 105, at 155 (noting that additional junta policies have caused 
harm to “the entire Southeast Asian region, from large refugee outflows, to the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
other infectious diseases and the trafficking of drugs and human beings”).  
145.  Jeffrey Sachs, Myanmar: Sanctions Won't Work, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (July 27, 2004), 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/myanmar-sanctions-wont-work.  
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Burma has become steadily poorer.146 For example, U.S. trade restrictions 
“resulted in the closing of many garment factories, leading to tens of 
thousands of job losses.”147 Burma’s concessions and governmental change 
have garnered international attention, but foreign investment remains low 
due to the country’s lack of major foreign banks in the country, low-quality 
banking facilities, various exchange rates, unreliable infrastructure, and 
petroleum shortages.148  
B. Health  
Generally, Burma has received the “lowest level of official development 
assistance among all of the least developed countries in Asia.”149 Limited 
access to adequate diagnosis and antiretroviral treatment as well as the use 
of counterfeit anti-malarials, has cause increased rates of mortality.150 
Although Burma has made progress on health over the past twenty years, 
“much remains to be done beyond 2015 to sustain the gains that have been 
made to date.”151  
 
 
 
C. Labor and Women’s Rights  
After implementation of the BFDA, the U.S. State Department estimated 
“a loss of 60,000 jobs in the textile sector alone.”152 Additionally, U.S. 
sanctions on Burma have resulted in 400,000 layoffs, greatly affecting 
 
 
146.  See Ewing-Chow, supra note 105, at 158 (“The US State Department reports also suggest that 
per capita incomes in Myanmar fell from US$300 to US$225 from 2003 to 2004, a fall largely 
attributable to the BFDA. Unofficial estimates of the per capita income in 2005 suggest an even greater 
fall to US $145 . . . .”).   
147.  Responsible Investment in Myanmar: The Human Rights Dimension, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. & 
BUS., Sept. 2012, at 5, https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Occasional-Paper-1-Burma-Myanmar-FINAL.pdf.  
148.  Id. at 7.  
149.  Yu Mon Saw et al., Taking stock of Myanmar’s progress toward the health-related Millennium 
Development Goals: Current Roadblocks, Paths Ahead, INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH, Sept. 11, 2013, at 1, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3847191/pdf/1475-9276-12-78.pdf. “Of the 187 
countries the [UNDP] evaluated in its [HDI] for 2011, Myanmar ranked 149th.” Responsible Investment 
in Myanmar, supra note 147, at 8. See also Burma: Health and Transition, infra note 150 (noting that 
Burma “has some of the worst health indicators in the world” with a life expectancy of 56 years).  
150.  Burma: Health and Transition, 379 THE LANCET 2313, 2313 (June 23, 2012) (“Burma has 
more than 50% of all malaria-related deaths in southeast Asia . . . attributed to lack of access to adequate 
diagnosis and treatment, the use of counterfeit anti-malarials, and conflict. An estimated 15000 people 
die every year in Burma because of lack of access to antiretroviral treatment . . . .”).  
151.  See Yu Mon Saw et al., supra note 149, at 6.  
152.  See Ewing-Chow, supra note 105, at 158.   
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women working in the textile industry, many of whom have been forced 
into prostitution, a “prescription for early death from AIDS.”153 Overall, 
displaced women in conflict zones are particularly susceptible to 
“abductions, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, and exploitation.”154 
Few prosecutions of sexual violence have been publicly reported, yet there 
are allegations of “more than 115 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by 
the Burmese army since fighting renewed.”155 Despite their central role in 
human rights and democratization, women in Burma have been 
marginalized in peace process initiatives.156  
D. Ethnic Conflict and Armed Forces  
“Approximately one third of [Burma’s] population consists of ethnic 
minority groups.”157 The Muslim ethnic minorities, the Rohingyas, continue 
to face systemic human rights violations and have even been denied 
citizenship, which “has facilitated enduring rights abuses, including 
restrictions on movement; limitations on access to health care, livelihood, 
shelter, and education; arbitrary arrests and detention; and forced labor.”158 
Hostility between armed groups has also continued, despite the Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement (“NCA”) that was written under the previous Thein 
Sein government.159 The 2012 Rakhine State riots, a series of violent 
conflicts between the Rakhine Buddhists and the “Rohingya” Muslims, “left 
 
 
153.  HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 54. 
154.  See Burma: Events of 2016, World Report 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burma#d5e077 (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) 
[hereinafter Burma: Events of 2016].  
155.  Id. (“In October and November, media and local groups reported numerous incidents of rape 
and other sexual assault of Rohingya women and girls committed by security forces during the ‘clearing 
operations’ in Maungdaw district. The government denied all reports of sexual violence, and the military 
lockdown has prevented independent investigations . . . .”). Such governmental suppression is symbolic 
of “the military’s long-standing refusal to seriously investigate cases of sexual violence.” Id.  
156.  Id. (“Women made up less than 10 percent of participants in the peace process, and women’s 
rights groups were sidelined at the 21st Century Panglong Conference. Women hold only 13 percent of 
seats in the new parliament; only one woman sits on the 18-person cabinet . . . .”).  
157.  Amnesty Int’l, The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, AI INDEX ASA 
16/005/2004 1 (May 2004), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/92000/asa160052004en.pdf (“[T]he seven ethnic 
minority states take their names from the Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine 
nationalities.”). It should be noted that every Burmese State and Division is comprised of a mixture of 
ethnic nationalities. Id. at 1-2. 
158.  Burma: Events of 2016, supra note 154. 
159.  Id. Since the adoption of the NCA, “military operations and clashes between signatory and 
non-signatory armed groups have continued.” Id. In 2016, “fighting between ethnic armed groups and 
government forces in Karen State displaced about 5,900 civilians.” Id.   
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200 dead and displaced thousands.”160 Since then, deadly incidents continue 
to spread, with the most recent incidents resulting in over 120,000 Rohingya 
people fleeing to Bangladesh.161 
E. Freedom of Expression and Assembly  
Thein Sein pledged to release all political prisoners by the end of his 
term, but he continued arresting activists under politically motivated 
charges at the end of his rule.162 Even with 235 political prisoners released 
under the new NLD-led government, restrictions on free speech remain.163 
For example, many activists were arrested under the Telecommunications 
Act for “‘defaming’ Aung San Suu Kyi, President Htin Kyaw, or the 
military in social media posts.”164 Arrests and prosecutions for participating 
in peaceful assemblies as well as the criminalization of expression continue 
to be a problem under the new administration.165 
VI. BURMA’S LIFTED SANCTIONS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
In 2009, President Obama created a new approach to relations with 
Burma—sanctions would be maintained, but with a willingness to open 
“high-level dialogue” with the SPDC.166 This policy would further the goals 
of preceding administrations — supporting “a unified, peaceful, prosperous, 
and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens” — by 
pressing Burma’s leaders to release political prisoners, cease conflict with 
ethnic minorities, end human rights violations, and initiate internal political 
dialogue.167 Following Burma’s political transformation towards a quasi-
 
 
160.  Why is There Communal Violence in Myanmar?, BBC NEWS  (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788.  
161.  John Haltiwanger, Is Genocide Occurring Against the Rohingya in Myanmar?, NEWSWEEK 
(Sept. 5, 2017, 11:21 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/genocide-occurring-against-rohingya-myanmar-
experts-weigh-659841.  
162.  Burma: Events of 2016, supra note 154. 
163.  Id. (“In April, two Muslim interfaith activists were convicted on charges under section 17(1) 
of the Unlawful Association Act and sentenced to an additional two years in prison . . . .”).  
164.  See id. (listing individual activists such as Maung Saungkha, who was sentenced for a period 
of six months for posting a poem on Facebook, and Aung Win Hlaing, who was sentenced to nine months 
for referring to the president as an “idiot” and “crazy” on Facebook). 
165.  Id. Expression was perceived as a threat to armed forces, thus various organizations and 
activists have been charged for accusing the military of humanitarian wrongs. Id. For instance,  
the Ta’ang Women’s Organization was forced to cancel a press conference that documented military 
abuses against ethnic Palaung. Id. Also, Khine Myo Htun, an environmental activist, and Htin Kyaw, a 
veteran activist, were charged with violating the penal code for “accusing the military of committing 
human rights abuses.” Id.    
166.  See Xu & Albert, supra note 100. Dialogue included international security interests such as 
“nuclear nonproliferation and North Korean arms sales.” Id.  
167. MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43035, U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: 
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civilian government, the U.S. announced further steps for cooperation in 
2012,168 including reestablishing a United States Agency for International 
Development mission, easing bans on new investment in Burma, and 
waiving the previous restrictions of financial services to Burma and the 
previous import ban of Burmese goods.169 On October 7, 2016, Obama 
ordered U.S. economic sanctions on Burma lifted given political reform 
over the previous five years following decades of oppressive military 
rule.170  
The current “military’s brutal crackdown on ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine 
State and other abuses against civilians in ethnic areas,” however, have 
undermined the “promise of the political transition” towards 
democratization.171 The new civilian-led government that took office in 
March of 2016 has “failed to hold the military accountable for persistent 
human rights violations throughout the country.”172 In 2016, Human Rights 
Watch reported that “[a]bout 32,000 Rohingya [were] sheltered in camps 
administered by the United Nations,” with “hundreds of thousands who 
have never been allowed to register as refugees or to lodge asylum claims,” 
 
 
ISSUES FOR THE 133TH CONGRESS 1 (2013). To carry out these goals, the Obama administration “would 
also call for Burma to sever its political and military ties to North Korea and abandon its alleged nuclear 
weapons program.” Id.  
168.  Id. In response to promising developments in Burma, the Obama administration increased 
high-level meetings with the Thein Sein government and eased many of the existing sanctions. Id. at 2. 
Since adopting the new policy, “the first U.S. ambassador to Burma in 20 years has been appointed, 
Hillary Clinton became the first Secretary of State in over 50 years to visit Burma, and President Obama 
subsequently became the first U.S. President to visit Burma while in  
office.” Id. 
169.  See id.  
170. Matthew Pennington, Obama Orders US Economic Sanctions on Myanmar Lifted, U.S. NEWS 
(Oct. 7, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-10-07/obama-orders-us-
economic-sanctions-on-myanmar-lifted (easing prohibitions by removing Burma’s national emergency, 
lifting a ban on jadeite and ruby imports from Burma, and removing banking restrictions). The Executive 
Order states in part: 
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the situation that 
gave rise to the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997, 
with respect to the actions and policies of the Government of Burma . . . has been significantly 
altered by Burma's substantial advances to promote democracy, including historic elections in 
November 2015 that resulted in the former opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy, winning a majority of seats in the national parliament and the formation of a 
democratically elected, civilian-led government; the release of many political prisoners; and 
greater enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression 
and freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Accordingly, I hereby terminate the national 
emergency declared in Executive Order 13047, and revoke that order . . . .   
Exec. Order No. 13,742, 81 Fed. Reg. 70,593 (Oct. 7, 2016). 
171.  Burma: Government Forces Implicated in Killings and Rape, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 
12, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/burma-government-forces-implicated-
killings-and-rape.  
172.  Id.  
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subjecting them to live undocumented, in makeshift camps, or in private 
dwellings, “vulnerable to human traffickers and exploited as cheap 
labor.”173 While President Trump has not addressed his approach to 
Obama’s lifted sanctions in Burma, measures should be taken as the Trump 
administration starts “to formulate its broader policy stance toward 
Southeast Asia.”174 
VII. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND 
BURMA 
As both Cuba and Burma share “long histories of military dictatorship, 
censorship, human rights abuses, failed socialism, embargoes, and 
economic devastation,”175 Burma’s challenges to democratization may 
serve as an indication of what lies ahead for Cuba. While the policy 
challenges posed by both countries’ human rights abuses are similar,176 the 
differences in the duration and terms of sanctions against Cuba and Burma 
may demonstrate otherwise. History undeniably influences foreign policy. 
As such, it is important to appreciate the implications of our past, which in 
turn allows us to address our present.  
Unilateral sanctions were imposed on Cuba under the FAA in 1961, 
resulting from Fidel Castro seizing power in 1959 and the increased tensions 
of the Cold War.177 The result was a total trade ban against Cuba.178 
Burmese sanctions, on the other hand, were not imposed until 1990 under 
the CTA and upon anti-government protests and SLORC post-election 
restrictions.179 The result in this case was not a total ban, but merely 
conditional sanctions if specified conditions were not met.180 Upon seizing 
power in 1962 by staging a coup d'état, General Ne Win imposed similar 
 
 
173.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2017: EVENTS OF 2016 118 (2017). For recent 
updates regarding the ongoing discrimination of the Rohingya minorities see Gibbens, infra note 203. 
174.  David Nakamura, As Trump Administration Focuses On Southeast Asia, Concerns Over its 
Approach to Burma, WASH. POST (May 6, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-trump-
administration-focuses-on-southeast-asia-concerns-over-its-approach-to-burma/2017/05/05/e933156c-
3197-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.da71b0d331d8.  
175.  Casey Cagley, ‘Disciplined Democracy’—Lessons for Cuba from Myanmar, 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/casey-cagley/disciplined-demo 
cracy-lessons-for-cuba-from-myanmar.  
176.  See Mauricio Claver-Carone, To Change Cuba, Stick with the Burma Model, THE HILL (Apr. 
11, 2012, 8:42 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/221065-to-change-cuba-
stick-with-the-burma-model- (comparing political reform and sanctions in Burma and Cuba). U.S. 
sanctions were weakened by investments from “regime-friendly neighbors” in China, India, and 
Thailand in the case of Burma and Venezuela, Canada, and Spain in the case of Cuba. Id.  
177.  See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, supra note 21.  
178.  Id.  
179.  See MARTIN, supra note 112, at 11-12. 
180.  Id. 
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reforms in Burma as Castro had done in Cuba, except without U.S. 
intrusion.181 Like Castro, Ne Win nationalized the Burmese economy,182 
suppressed protests by jailing and killing thousands of demonstrators,183 and 
mismanaged the country with governmental corruption.184 In fact, Ne Win’s 
nationalization and isolation policies prior to the sanctions of 1990 resulted 
in Burma becoming one of the world’s poorest countries.185  Despite the 
initial relaxed sanctions against Burma whose previous corrupt general, Ne 
Win, mirrored Castro’s human rights violations, both countries gradually 
experienced worsening sanctions post-1990.  
By 1997, the U.S. had prohibited any new assistance in Burma and 
Cuba.186 The CDA of 1992 against Cuba and the FOA of 1997 against 
Burma were similar in that they limited trade and hindered both economies, 
but the CDA against Cuba ultimately became a multilateral embargo, 
engendering more economic and international ramifications against 
Cuba.187 The CDA of 1992 prohibited all foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies from trading with Cuba, whereas the prohibition of non-
humanitarian assistance under the FOA in Burma was limited to the United 
States.188  Subsequently, the 1992 CDA caused U.S. trade with Cuba 
 
 
181.  See Nyun, supra note 101, at 474. 
182.  Compare The Ne Win Years: 1962-1988, OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE,  
http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2018), with 
Suddath, supra note 15, and Leon Neyfakh, Cuba, You Owe Us $7 Billion, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 18, 
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/04/18/cuba-you-owe-billion/jHAufRfQJ9Bx24T 
uzQyBNO/story.html (noting the U.S. assets Castro seized “in the process of nationalizing the Cuban 
economy”).  
183.   Compare U Ne Win, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/U-
Ne-Win (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (“[T]he government [under Ne Win] resorted to brutal measures to 
suppress the uprisings that included killing hundreds of demonstrators and jailing thousands more.”), 
and U Ne Win, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/ people/u-ne-win-9422402#synopsis (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2018) (discussing how Ne Win replaced Parliament with a military dictatorship and he 
often jailed his opponents), with Cuba: Events of 2015, supra note 82 (“Detention is often used 
preemptively to prevent people from participating in peaceful marches or meetings to discuss politics. 
Detainees are often beaten, threatened, and held incommunicado for hours or days.”). 
184.  Compare Xu & Albert, supra note 100 (“By 1988, widespread corruption and food shortages 
led to mass protests, spearheaded by students.”), with Alejandro Armengol, Corruption in Cuba: an 
External Curse or Inherent to the System?, HAVANA TIMES (May 3, 2017), http://www.havanatimes.org 
/?p=125066 (comparing Fidel Castro’s lack of uncovering corruption with Raul Castro’s priority in 
prosecuting corruption). 
185.  See Ewing-Chow, supra note 105.  
186.  See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 32; see also Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, supra note 117. 
187.  Compare Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6003 (seeking international cooperation), with 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, § 570(a)(1)-(2) 
(imposing multilateral restrictions only to international financial institutions).  
188.  Compare Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (imposing sanctions against countries 
assisting Cuba), with Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
§ 570(a)(1) (“There shall be no United States assistance to the Government of Burma, other than: (A) 
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through foreign subsidiaries to fall from $718 million in 1991 to $1.6 
million in 1992.189 Notwithstanding these strengthened sanctions, the U.S. 
eventually relaxed restrictions and offered to end these embargoes on the 
condition of “substantial and measurable progress” towards ending human 
rights violations and implementing a democratic government in the case of 
Burma and the condition of a “democratically elected government in 
Cuba.”190 Once again, however, U.S. sanctions disproportionately 
disadvantaged Cuba because it would be much easier to implement 
“substantial and measurable progress” than to overthrow Fidel Castro (one 
of the longest-serving world leaders of all time), 191 his brother Raul Castro, 
or any subsequent dictator.  
Over fifteen U.S. sanctions programs assist in addressing “mass 
atrocities, civil conflict, human rights abuses, and/or political repression,” 
while usually restricting only limited types of business.192 With Cuba, 
however, the U.S. restricted essentially all business,193 and in 2016, Cuba 
ranked as the fifth most comprehensive U.S. sanctions program.194 Of the 
four countries subject to more sanctions than Cuba, the U.S. designates 
three—Iran, Sudan, and Syria—as “state sponsors of terrorism.”195 Despite 
the stringent sanctions against Cuba, when the Obama administration lifted 
the embargo, Cuba had not actually met the conditions required to lift it, 
namely transitioning to a democratic government.196   
 
 
humanitarian assistance . . . .”).  
189.  John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking 
Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of the United States, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 439, 448 (1999).  
190.  Compare Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6063(c)(3) (“The president shall, upon 
determining that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, submit that determination to 
the appropriate congressional committees and shall, subject to an authorization of appropriations and 
subject to the availability of appropriations, commence the delivery and distribution of assistance . . . 
.”), with Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, § 3(a)(3)(A)-(B) (imposing the conditions of making 
“substantial and measurable progress to end violations of internationally recognized human rights” and 
making “measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government” on the 
SPDC).  
191.  Anthony DePalma, Fidel Castro, Cuban Revolutionary Who Defied U.S., Dies at 90, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 26, 2016,), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/world/americas/fidel-castro-dies.html 
(recounting Fidel Castro’s long-lived power). “Fidel Castro had held on to power longer than any other 
living national leader except Queen Elizabeth II.” Id.  
192.  Harrell, supra note 1, at 11. Aside from Cuba and Burma, the other sanctions programs 
included: “Belarus . . . Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast . . . the Democratic 
Republic of Congo . . . Iraq . . . Lebanon . . . Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Venezuela, Yemen, and 
Zimbabwe.” Id. at 20 n.41. 
193.  Id. at 11. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. Removes Cuba From State-Sponsored Terrorism List, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/us/us-removes-cuba-from-state-
terrorism-list.html (removing Cuba from the State-Sponsored Terrorism List in 2015). 
196.  Michael Sliwinski, The U.S. and Cuba: The Path to Normalized Relations, LAW STREET (Jan. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/10
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Contrary to Cuba, Burma had made “substantial advances to promote 
democracy, including historic elections in November 2015,” thereby 
meeting its “substantial and measurable progress” requirement needed to 
lift the embargo.197  The differences in the circumstances surrounding the 
lifted embargo speaks to the inefficacy of the severe and outdated embargo 
against Cuba. If the embargo remained truly about human rights, the U.S. 
might cease doing business with other countries that defy “internationally 
accepted standards of human rights,” including one of the United States’ 
biggest trading partners—China.198 What might have begun as a means 
towards democratization has failed to achieve its goal; the embargo harms 
the people of Cuba and limits an economic opportunity for both the United 
States and Cuba. 
Though Burma and Cuba were both subjected to embargo restrictions, 
their approaches towards democratization have been different.199 Burma, for 
example, has implemented various political reforms, while the Cuban 
autocratic regime continues to dominate the country with limited economic 
reform.200 Prior to the 2012 policy changes, the Burmese government had 
“passed progressive legislation on the right to assemble, allowed for greater 
personal freedoms, released hundreds of political prisoners and entered into 
ceasefires with armed ethnic groups.”201 This is not to say that Burma has 
transitioned into a democracy—it is a work in progress. Burma’s military 
still retains too much control and there remains persecution of political 
 
 
6, 2015), https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/world/u-s-cuba-path-normalized-relations/ (“[T]he 
embargo could only be lifted if Cuba would: [l]egalize all political activity, release all political prisoners, 
commit to free and fair elections in the transition to representative democracy, grant freedom to the 
press, respect internationally recognized human rights, and allow labor unions.”). “Since Cuba has not 
met these conditions [sic] the embargo has endured.” Id.  
197.  Obama Orders US Economic Sanctions on Myanmar Lifted, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/obama-economic-sanctions-myanmar-
161007215716882.html.  
198. Michael J. Totten, Letter from Cuba: To Embargo or Not, WORLD AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2014), 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/letter-cuba-embargo-or-not.  
199.  See Cagley, supra note 175 (noting that Burma’s transition over the past five years towards a 
“disciplined democracy” provides one possible scenario for social and political transition in dictatorships 
like Cuba).  
200.  See Mauricio Claver-Carone, supra note 176. The Burmese military made a number of 
changes: “stepped aside in favor of a civilian government; legalized independent labor unions and 
strikes; authorized the creation of an independent National Human Rights Commission; relaxed press 
and internet censorship laws; released most political prisoners, and equally important, halted new 
political arrests.” Id. Castro’s economic “reforms,” on the other hand, were limited to “a handful of self-
employment measures, mostly recycled from the 1990's with the regime retaining ownership rights.” Id.  
201.  Erin Murphy, Parallels in Myanmar and Cuba Policy, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erinmurphy/parallels-in-myanmar-and-cuba-policy_b_6395342.html 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018).  
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dissidents and ethnic minorities.202 This is especially noticeable regarding 
the recent Rohingya “refugee crisis,” which has displaced at least 500,000 
Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh since August of 2017.203 In 2011, 
Raul Castro created some economic changes through expansion of self-
employment, decollectivization, and wider use of market prices.204 He, like 
the Burmese government, also released political prisoners and increased 
access to the internet.205 Nevertheless, authoritarian rule continues to 
dominate Cuba. Although social and economic reforms are important for 
countries hoping to achieve democratization, a country’s political climate 
plays a crucial role.    
There have been attempts by Cuban society leaders and democracy 
activists to “learn from Burma’s successes, failures, and ongoing 
struggles.”206 But Cuba’s current political environment will prevent it from 
experiencing the level of “political will” achieved by Burma over the last 
several years;207 real progress will require significant political change.208 
Therefore, even if democracy activists and the legislature express interest in 
a move towards democracy, there will not be significant change in Cuba 
until there is a change in regime, similar to Burma.209 It should be noted, 
however, that because the Cuban government faces no organized 
 
 
202.  See Editorial, Myanmar Has Made a Lot of Progress but not Enough That All Sanctions 
Should be Lifted, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-
ed-myanmar-sanctions-20160913-snap-story.html; see also Joshua Kurlantzick, From Rohingya to 
Ethnic Rebels, Myanmar’s Troubles Go Regional, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16030/from-rohingya-to-ethnic-rebels-myanmar-s-
troubles-go-regional (recounting one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world with at least 200 
killed and more than 50,000 driven out of their homes in a four month period).  
203.  See Sarah Gibbens, Myanmar’s Rohingya Are in Crisis – What You Need to Know, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 29, 2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/09/rohingya-refugee-crisis-
myanmar-burma-spd/ (detailing the ongoing discrimination of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority 
group).  
204.  See Murphy, supra note 201.  
205.  Id.  
206.  See Cagley, supra note 175. “In August 2016, the International Republican Institute (IRI) 
convened a group of eminent Cuban civil society leaders and democracy activists in Burma” to learn 
from their Burmese civil society counterparts. Id. The Cubans were able to interact and learn from 
members of the Burmese parliament and members of the “‘88 Generation’ – the pro-democracy student 
movement that led protests against the ruling military junta in 1988.” Id.  
207.  Roger R. Betancourt & Jorge A. Sanguinetty, Is There Political Will Towards 
Democratization in Cuba?, 18 CUBA IN TRANSITION 313, 313 (2008), http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/v18-betancourtsanguinetty.pdf (defining political will as “a government’s 
commitment and ability to act in the furthering or the reversal of a democratization process” and 
distinguishing commitment from ability).  
208.  Burma’s political change, while in the right direction, has not reached the level of 
democratization required to prevent its ongoing human rights abuses.  
209.  Betancourt & Sanguinetty, supra note 207, at 320 (arguing that “[l]egislatures and the judicial 
system have little influence other than as rubber stamp mechanisms”). “Civil society institutions are 
weak by design and [those] with an autonomous influence, the dissidents, are frequently persecuted by 
the current regime” which can serve as a major deterrent. Id.  
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opposition,210 it might be in a better position for democratization than 
Burma, depending on Cuba’s future leader.211 The Burmese constitution of 
2008 reserves twenty-five percent of the seats in parliament for the military 
and grants them control of the most important ministries, including control 
over all public administration, education, and the economy.212 So long as 
the military holds all of this power and control, it would be difficult for 
Burma to have a “true democracy.”213 Even though Castro holds just as 
much if not more power as the sole dictator, Fidel Castro’s death in 2016 
and Raul Castro’s future resignation in 2018214 represent a historic 
opportunity for change for Cuba. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN CUBA 
Currently, democratization in Cuba is especially important with 
Obama’s repeal of “wet foot, dry foot” on January 12, 2017, a policy that 
allowed most Cuban migrants who reach U.S. soil to stay and become 
permanent residents after one year.215 Democratization is even more critical 
at this point in time now that Cuban citizens will no longer be able to flee 
Cuba to escape human rights violations and political grievances as easily as 
before.  
This Note stands for the proposition that comprehensive sanctions 
against Cuba have been counterproductive in bringing about regime change. 
Given the negative effects of sanctions as well as the increased cooperation 
and business opportunities for both U.S. and Cuba as a result of the lifted 
embargo,216 the U.S. should maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba rather 
than restore full sanctions. Some indicators of progress in Cuba that have 
provided its citizens with more political and economic liberalization 
 
 
210.  Joshua Kurlantzick, Is Washington’s Myanmar Policy the Model for U.S.-Cuba 
Normalization?, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com 
/articles/18149/is-washington-s-myanmar-policy-the-model-for-u-s-cuba-normalization.  
211.  If Cuba’s next leader wants to transition towards democracy, it would be an easier hurdle than 
Burma, whose military still retains the majority of control over the country.  
212.  Eliecer Avila, Lessons from Myanmar, TRANSLATING CUBA (Sept. 4, 2016), 
http://translatingcuba.com/lessons-from-myanmar-14ymedio-eliecer-avila/.  
213.  Id.  
214.  See Sesin, infra note 216.  
215.  Alan Gomez, Obama Ends 'Wet Foot, Dry Foot' Policy for Cubans, USA TODAY (Jan. 
12, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/12/obama-ends-wet-foot-dry-
foot-policy-cubans/96505172/ (ending a 20-year-old policy created by President Clinton in 1995). 
“Effective immediately, Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not 
qualify for humanitarian relief will be subject to removal.” Id.  
216.  See generally Carmen Sesin, Cuba after Castro: How Much Change, and How Quickly?, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 27, 2016, 8:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/27/cuba-after-castro-how-much-
change-and-how-quickly.html.  
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include: business,217 national security,218 health,219 environment,220 
family,221 and entrepreneurship.222  Furthermore, if the embargo were 
reinstated in its entirety, it would harm U.S. companies,223 disconnect 
families, make the region less safe, halt collaborative research between the 
two countries,224 and have international implications.225  
While real change may be not be expected until April 19, 2018226 — the 
first time since the Cuban Revolution that a Castro will not be in power — 
further change in Cuba may depend in part on President Donald Trump and 
his administration. Even though President Trump’s foreign policy reversing 
the lifted embargo has yet to be “officially” implemented by legislation, the 
Trump administration has announced its plans to tighten the economic 
embargo on Cuba.227 Therefore, future U.S.-Cuba relations will likely rest 
in part on the subsequent Cuban regime to “democratize” Cuba, unless 
“Libertad” is repealed.228 If the Trump administration were to balance 
 
 
217.  Carlos Gutierrez, An Opportunity for Donald Trump in Cuba, THE HILL (Dec. 17, 2016, 1:01 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/310864-an-opportunity-for-donald-
trump-in-cuba. Various U.S. businesses have negotiated deals with Cuba, including but not limited to 
ten airlines, four telecommunications companies, four cruise lines, Airbnb, and Google. Id.  
218.  Id. (“Joint counter-narcotics efforts are helping keep our borders safe through cross-border 
information-sharing, and the U.S. and Cuban governments are continuing to have dialogue on law 
enforcement issues including counter terrorism, cyber security, and secure travel and trade.”).  
219.  Both the U.S. and Cuba are working to fight infectious diseases such as Zika and dengue 
fever. Id. Also, the “Roswell Park Cancer Institute is preparing to launch clinical trials of a potentially 
life-saving cancer vaccine developed in Cuba.” Id. 
220.  The United States and Cuba “signed an environment cooperation agreement” that will help 
protect both countries’ “coasts and marine life, reduce disaster risks, and address marine pollution.” Id. 
221.  “New programs such as CubaOne are offering young Cuban Americans the opportunity to 
travel to the island to learn about their heritage.” Id. Despite Cuba being the only country in the world 
where U.S. citizens are restricted by its government to travel as a tourist, “U.S. travel to Cuba has 
increased by [eighty] percent in the last two years . . . .” Id.   
222.  See Gutierrez, supra note 217 (noting that as a result of the remittances from the lifted 
embargo, a quarter of the workforce in Cuba has entered the private sector).  
223.  A 2016 report by the USITC found that “if U.S. restrictions on Cuba were lifted, U.S. exports 
could increase to $2.2 billion, up from $180 million last year.” Id.  
224.  See Sesin, supra note 216 (determining that the lifted embargo “permits Cuban pharmaceutical 
companies to do business with the United States and allows the United States and Cuba to conduct joint 
medical research”).  
225.  For example, the EU and Cuba recently signed an agreement to normalize ties, which might 
affect the U.S. companies that have already established business in Cuba. See Gutierrez, supra note 217 
(explaining that as Cuba continues to sign deals with other countries such as Russia, China and Europe, 
U.S. companies will be locked out).  
226.   Kaelyn Forge, Raul Castro: I’m stepping down as Cuba’s president on April 19, ABC NEWS 
(Dec. 21, 2017, 7:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/raul-castro-stepping-leader-cuba-
2018/story?id=51932114. Due to Hurricane Irma, Cuba’s municipal elections have been extended to 
March 2018 and its presidential election to April 2018. Id.  
227.  See Harris, supra note 99.  
228.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6064(a) (“[T]he President, after consultation with the Congress, is 
authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba . . . to the extent that such steps 
contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba.”).  
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democratization with the United States’ financial stake in the country, it 
should realize the potential benefit for both countries. If an embargo 
implemented primarily to deter human rights abuse in Cuba  has been in 
place for over fifty years, the U.S. should not take steps to further inhibit 
the already growing Cuban economy and its progress.  
Be that as it may, the uncertainty over who will succeed the Castro 
brothers poses concern regarding a change in policy. Perhaps the Trump 
administration will want to use the embargo as a foreign policy bargaining 
tool in the event that Cuba’s new leader proves to be more autocratic than 
Raul and Fidel Castro. In that case, the Trump administration’s tactic in 
unveiling a more restrictive Cuba policy might work to its favor. Another 
factor to take into account, mentioned by proponents of the embargo, is 
Cuba’s prior hostile responses to U.S. attempts to soften sanctions.229 
Nonetheless, when balancing humanitarian efforts with the interests of the 
United States as a whole, this Note suggests that the Trump administration 
take a middle ground amidst the uncertainty of Castro’s successor and 
Cuba’s failure in meeting the Libertad conditions required to lift the 
embargo in the first place. 230 A middle ground approach could consist of 
applying a more targeted sanction program as opposed to the previously 
severe and comprehensive embargo against Cuba.231 President Trump’s 
proposed directive in some ways strikes this balance by limiting the United 
States from engaging in business with firms controlled by the Cuban 
military, intelligence, or security services.232 However,  debate persists over 
the extent of the military’s control of the Cuban economy.233 Additionally, 
 
 
229.  See Carol J. Williams, Widely Condemned U.S. Policy on Cuba Unlikely to Change Soon, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/16/world/la-fg-wn-us-cuba-embargo-
20121115. President Carter tried to normalize relations with Cuba, “only to be rebuffed by the 1980 
Mariel boatlift that carried 125,000 would-be emigres, prisoners and mental patients to U.S. shores.” Id. 
Under President Clinton, “Cuban defense forces shot down two planes in international airspace that had 
been searching for Cuban rafters.” Id. Under President Obama, Cuba detained Alan Gross, a U.S. 
government emissary who was caught installing technological communications equipment in Cuba. Id.  
230.  See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, supra note 39. 
231.  See Harrell, supra note 1; see also supra Section I (detailing the history of the Cuban Embargo, 
starting from el Bloqueo in 1960 under Eisenhower, to the FAA of 1961, to the CDA of 1992, to Libertad 
in 1996, to the TSRA of 2000).  
232.  See Davis, supra note 95. 
233. Compare Marc Frank, Cuban Military’s Tentacles Reach Deep Into Economy, REUTERS (June 
15, 2017, 5:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-military/cuban-militarys-tentacles-
reach-deep-into-economy-idUSKBN1962VK (“Trump’s expected limits on U.S. business deals will 
target the Armed Forces Business Enterprises Group (GAESA), a conglomerate involved in all sectors 
of the economy” which “boasts dozens of companies that control anywhere from 40 percent to 60 percent 
of the Caribbean island’s foreign exchange earnings, according to Cuban economists.”), with William 
M. LeoGrande, Does the Cuban Military Really Control Sixty Percent of the Economy?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 28, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/does-the-cuban-military-
really-control-sixty-percent_us_59530b0ee4b0f078efd985d8 (“Emilio Morales at the Havana 
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limiting American tourism could do more harm than good, resulting in 
economic hardship to the Cuban people while failing to achieve the 
ostensible goal of contributing towards the democratization process.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
By looking to Burma’s progress towards a civilian parliament, Cuba can 
see the potential for implementing democratic change in its own country. 
Burma’s current ongoing violence against the Rohingya people does not 
discount this as a learning opportunity for Cuba and the United States alike 
– it further reveals how the process towards democratization does not 
always amount to lower rates of human rights violations. The United States’ 
embargo against Cuba, lasting almost sixty years,234 has proved to be 
inefficient at promoting democracy and human rights. The U.S. and Cuban 
governments recently began a complex process of creating an amicable 
bilateral relationship, and a complete repeal of the lifted embargo might 
undue the United States’ inability to overcome six decades of mistrust. But 
the fact remains that Cuba has yet to make the necessary changes toward 
democratization. Thus, if further progress is not reached under the new 
Cuban "President,”235 the Trump administration should continue to work 
with Congress to create a more targeted sanctions program that is tailored 
to advancing U.S. interests in Cuban democratization, while providing 
support for the Cuban people.  
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Consulting Group . . . estimates GAESA’s total current revenue at $3.8 billion” which “constitutes 
21% of total hard currency income from both state enterprises and the private sector, 8% of total state 
revenue, and just 4% of GDP . . . a long way from 60% of the economy . . . .”). 
234.  See Harrell, supra note 1.  
235. See Forge, supra note 226 (predicting the successor to be Miguel Diaz-Canal, Cuba’s current 
vice president). This transition to a non-Castro regime “could result in a further opening with the U.S., 
as the Libertad Act of 1996, which strengthened the U.S. embargo against Cuba, lists as one of its 
requirements for a transition government that it ‘not include Fidel Castro and Raul Castro’. . . .” Id.  
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